Mahan vs. Corbett

AT Mahan (left) and JS Corbett (right) with their seminal works

BACKGROUND: I promised frequent commentator ‘davesgonechina’ a short comparison between Mahan and Corbett.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) and his book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) have had a huge impact on naval military thinking. He was definitely one of the first theorists of sea power, but that surely does not mean he was the best. Julian S. Corbett (1854-1922) offers a more nuanced and objective theory in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).

A quick overview of the difference between Mahan and Corbett: Mahan thought that the Navy was the most important part of the military and should be central to all planning; that absolute control of the sea was imperative; and that the bigger the ships you had the better. Corbett was more of a predecessor to Thomas Barnett. He thought of the Navy “within the context of everything else”, subordinate to greater strategic planning. Corbett argued that a Navy should be light, with fast boats to protect Sea Lines of Communcation (SLOC), or in other words trade and communication routes.

Mahan was writing for the American public, advocating a better funded Navy (which he was a part of), appealing for the US naval power to mirror that of Britain. Corbett was a professional historian writing for a British audience, writing ont he role of navies in geopolitics. In my opinion Mahan represents a class of “military theorist” that I think should be properly labelled “military advocacy” in that he has an agenda wrapped in an analysis. Another example of this is Napoleonic strategist Antione-Henri Jomini.

Julian Corbett was never in the navy, so he loses points for firsthand experience. Mahan wasn’t a model captain though, crashing most of his ships, and in fact dreaded going to sea. Corbett was a trained lawyer, and unlike Mahan, was an experienced historian who has a much more professional and robust theoretical approach in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Mahan’s theory rested on inductive reasoning, using carefully selected historical analogues to “prove” his theory, similar to Jomini’s approach in the Art of War. This type of argumentation is prevalent throughout the beginning of the Scientific Age.

It is undeniable that Mahan has been much more influential than Corbett. I must admit that I have not read any of Mahan’s later books, which may account for his overall popularity.

Note that I am not saying that Mahan’s strategy of total control of the seas is not viable and should immediately be abandoned for Corbett’s strategy of SLOC defense; only that Mahan’s theory is not the “one theory to rule them all.” The Mahanian sea power strategy worked relatively well for both the British and American Navy, but other countries that don’t have the resources to maintain a massively powerful maritime presence should look to Corbett and others for ideas on how to develop their navies. Canada, and countries like her are a good example of this.

Furthermore, the US Navy/policymakers/pundits should pay more attention to Corbett as he offers a more horizontal view of naval policy within the greater framework of homeland defense etc. He also provides insight into other possible naval configurations which the US Navy might come up against.