I seriously doubt that the existence of enclaves is more powerful in regional politics than the fact that strongly biased and unfavorable treaties ensuring free exchange of water for gas for electricity and so on were re-signed at independence and that Uzbekistan (and the other two, although to a lesser degree) has been reneging on its duties.

I would also like to emphasize that humanitarian projects set up to promote cross-border cooperation in the enclaves have generally been successful, and people report that they used to cooperate easily, but- ekh, the problems they have with the border guards are extremely complicated, having to do with the fact that the presidents recruit soldiers from their own regions, meaning that people from both sides of the border are unable to communicate with the border guards, because of regional dialects.

As for ensuring fighting between the three states- it’s much too difficult to prove that something doesn’t exist, so I’d very much like to see a report of a real instance of fighting, if possible, between any of those countries, excepting attacks by farmers on border posts because the guards were extorting bribes, or the deaths of shepherd boys and their sheep.

“he didn’t have to pay before the enclave was created.”

Because he wasn’t alive then. The enclave was created under the Soviets, when the borders were nominal at best, and there was freedom of movement between villages. The borders were effectively “put up” after the Soviets left.

“yet the likelihood of this happening is about zero”

Actually, the probability is actually around 1, since in fact Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan continue to implement positive treaties which allow for cross-border traffic and opening markets, as well as sharing electricity.

Uzbekistan is another story.

“Although Stalin died over 50 years ago, his policy of divide et impera is still working half a century later”

I won’t defend Stalin, but the ancestors of said countries also played their own roles in the formation of borders. E.g.-
-Uzbekistan’s manoevering for Samarkand and Bukhara in exchange for what is now known as the Qurghon-Teppa part of Tajikistan
-Tajikistan’s manoevering for its own country because they did not want to be together with the Turks
Kyrghyz khaan’s manoevering for a separate language from the lowland Uzbeks, although despite 80 years of codification and separate educational systems, the two languages remain as mutually intelligible as Liverpudlian and Bostonian (for example). If anybody says it ain’t so, come and see it they have conversations.

“the Fergana Valley’s bizarre and totally impractical division”

It wasn’t impractical under the Soviet Union, when the enclaves were meant to show respect to the natives’ ethnicity, and when the republics were even less independent from Moscow and one another than the US states from one another. They sincerely expected those nominal borders- in the Caucases and in Central Asia- to totally dissolve within another 50 years, as the nations integrated and became one. You might find it fantastic, but the Soviets also found the capitalists’ belief that theirs was a sustainable, progressive system ridiculous.

“which pose serious challenges to state sovereignty there.”

Really? We haven’t noticed. One would think that the greater challenges to state sovereignty might include:
-The fact that around 25% of Tajikistan’s population is Uzbek
-The fact that around 30% of Uzbekistan’s population used to be Tajik, until of course Tajiks were targeted as enemies of the state and offered to change their nationalities to prove their loyalty
-The fact that Tajiks and Uzbeks are strongly regionalistic, and thus the governments rightly fear regional-cum-ethnic uprisings
-The fact that the people of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrghyzstan are suffering, getting quite fed up, and annoyed (respectively) by the mafias that run their governments. Admittedly Kyrghyzstan has a small chance at democracy but note that the fact that Osh was mainly Uzbek was a much larger issue in their rainbow revolution than, say, the enclaves.

I agree that enclaves are generally a bad thing, but I think you’ve taken the whole Evil-Empire/Islamofascism-is-the-new-threat fads too seriously. Enclaves are important, but they are hardly a strong support for islamofascism compared to other problems, such as poverty.

They play a much, much smaller role in the politics of the three countries than the normal borders and the old, unequal arrangements for natural resource exploitation.

The problem with enclaves is generally the disruption of normal life and their subsequent reinforcement of resentment against the governments (note that ALL of the violence in the Ferghana Valley in the past five years was directed not at other ethnic groups, but at border guards-for taking bribes and treating women disrespectfully).

However even this is a problem that many people in Central Asia face, because they have relatives across the border. They used to cross Saresiyo all the time, and Gulbahor, and south of Osh, to see their friends and go to school. Just like in the enclaves.

Just like in the enclaves, the people in Central Asia are usually made miserable by rationing of electricity, gas, and water, not by their borders. That is where cooperation needs to start, and if the enclaves come up in conversation, you can be sure it’s a stalling tactic to delay the inevitable question:

Why don’t the countries of Central Asia buy and sell their natural resources at world-market prices, rather than trading in kind?

First reaction: “Good God, Why?!?”
Immedaite counter-reaction: “Stalin’s an ass.”