“The Middle East and Soviet Military Strategy,” by Michael MccGwire, Middle East Report, No. 151, Mar.-Apr. 1988, pp 11-17, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28198803%2F04%290%3A151%3C11%3ATMEASM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D.

While working on my litera…

“Chinese Identity Politics“:

Even in the United States, growing numbers of ethnic Chinese will distinguish between Chinese nationals (zhongguoren or 中圔¹Ã¤ÂºÂº), the Chinese language and culture (zhongwen or 中攓”¡), and ethnic Chinese (huaren or èÂ?¯äºº), except in cases where the context is clear.

If you think on it, this shouldn’t be such a big deal. After all, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and US Americans speak “English”, but you’d be hard pressed to find an Angeleno, a Vancouverite, an Aucklander, or a Canberran refer to himself as “English”. (For that matter, most Scots will be quick to point out that they are, in fact, Scotch—even Lowlanders whose ancestry includes plenty of English blood.)

Why then is there no such confusion in the Anglosphere?

1) Niall Ferguson argues that Britain should not have entered the war against Germany over the invasion of the Low Countries in 1914 because all Germany really wanted was economic domination of Europe, and they ended up getting that anyway.

Do you agree or disagree?

2) Central European history is not my strong point, but the point about the Austrian Empire being founded in 1804 looks a bit suspect to me. The ruler of Austria at that point, I believe, was Francis II, ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, which seems to at that point basically been the Austrians running the show, and in that year he declared himself Frances I, Emporer of Austria. Was this just a cosmetic change, or was it substance? Or something else? How did the borders of the new “Austrian Empire” differ from the Holy Roman Empire circa 1803, as they were ruled by the same person?

3) An Arab World Angle (inevitabely): the Arab world is the place to look for the changing of artificial borders and the reassertion of historic cultural ties. The borders between Jordan, Iraq and Syria are all pretty meaningless. The Gulf countries are tribes with flags. I don’t think its likely, not making any predictions here, but increased democracy would increase the chance of such changes and unifications (or splits in Iraq and/or Syria).

Contemporary relevance point: this ethnic orientation and balance of power system is what few see with regard to Iraq: Iraq was like Germany after unification; so much bigger than its Arab rivals, with much to gain to the south, that an advance southward was almost inevitable, especially given the winds of Arab nationalism. But the new democratic/Shia-led system changes this. There is a double check now: the Shia being predominant in Iraq puts an end to Iraq’s regional ambitions, driving a stake into the monster that was Arab nationalism, and at the same time because they are Shia, they can’t expand themselves.

All Arab nationalism ever did was encourage Arab countries to wage senseless wars against Israel, stage coups in each others’ countries, and act as a fig leaf for tyranny. RIP

” On greater Germany:

Whether the Nazis rose or not, Germany would have retaken most of its lost territory.

I never thought about it that way, but I think you’re right””?and that should be plastered on every modern historians wall.”

Most historians are aware of the degree to which Hitler incorporated traditional Prussian-German nationalist objectives, albeit in radicalized form, into the NSDAP worldview. Or borrowed from other ” alternative” viewpoints like Haushofer and Mackinder’s geopolitical theories, from whence Lebensraum comes. What historians have done rather poorly though is stress this element of continuity in Hitler’s foreign policy to the general public.

A quick look at the terms of The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is helpful in that regard.

http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/brestlitovsk.html

It is easier to stress the differences in the Second and Third Reich’s which are understandably quite dramatic. I think without Hitler, you would still have had a European war or two instigated by a nationalist post-Weimar Germany but not a Second World War and certainly not a Holocaust.

Guys, what about Mexico expanding northward? That’s certainly the demoraphic trend.

That’s the current demographic trend, but I expect it to reverse. There is good reason to believe that there is a third stage in the wealth-birthrate graph. We all know what happens in very poor societies… the birthrate booms. As the deathrate is reduced by imported healthcare, nutrition advances, etc.. the population booms with it. We also know what happens with a society that is wealthy by current standards… the birthrate drops as each individual child has more invested in them. As sex becomes a recreational activity instead of a procreational one, and as leisure time increases, the trend so far has been for population rates to hover around or below the replacement level. But are those the only possibilities? I think there is evidence in some of the vanguard samples in America that there may be a third stage: So much surplus wealth (financial + time + diversity of choices) that large parts of the population can choose to increase the societal birthrate to a level competitive with that of the 1st stage without sacrificing their own leisure time. We aren’t there yet as a society, but I’m convinced that’s where we are headed… and America is far away in the lead in that direction.

I personally see a large American migration into Latin America, Europe, and other parts of the world as one of the big demographic trends of the 21st century. I don’t think other populations can match that, as the current booming populations are looking at downturns in their birthrates as they go from abject poverty to a strong middle class.

Now whether that kind of yuppie American population explosion is a good thing or not, that’s a conversation for another time.

minor points to add. in addition to geography, there are also ethnic factors (as dusty pointed out), and ‘memory’ factor (“we used to own this”).

but it does not change your thesis signifantly, since, e.g., ethnic distribution is strongly correlated with geographic prximity and also ‘memory’/historic factor.

your analysis of Germany between wars also reminds me of the kuril dispute between russia and japan.

Some questions/considerations:

1.) American expansion:

re: Will America expand southwards one day?

or northward after a quebecois secession, which would split the maritimes from the rest of canada?

Guys, what about Mexico expanding northward? That’s certainly the demoraphic trend.

2.) The concept of buffer states came to mind.

3.) On greater Germany:

Whether the Nazis rose or not, Germany would have retaken most of its lost territory.

I never thought about it that way, but I think you’re right—and that should be plastered on every modern historians wall.

4.) Slovenia is shown inside the German perimeter, but surely it’s Slavic, no?

Simply because some forces emerged it doesn’t mean that they’ll fight, regardless of all other considerations.

I think that the size and power of states tell us only so much about what’s possible to happen and that the real causes of wars must be search for in other places, such as the structure of economic production, the political system, the legislation, the attitude towards leisure, work and production, etc.

Thus, looking at today’s world map, one may ask, will Russia reconquer its lost territory in Central Asia? Will China expand northwards or perhaps into South East Asia? Could India reabsorb Bangladesh, Bhutan or Nepal? Will America expand southwards one day? Will synthetic countries like Bosnia and Afghanistan be split and reattached to their respective ethnic homelands? The answers to all these questions may seem quite clear today, but looking back, it would be unwise to think so. Though the nation-state may be in decline, the rise of political and economic blocks led by regional leaders may essentially repeat what we’ve seen above, though in the form of an EU, or Chinese-lead Asian Union for example. Only time will tell and until then, si vis pacem para bellum.”

Yes. Absolutely. I don’t think I’ve agreed more with any other entry you’ve written. (Except maybe the one about how cool the Mongol exhibit is).

Alot of that quote about Stresemann leaves unsaid what I think was Stresemann’s more basic ambition—reuniting Germans and the land on which they live.

And regarding China (read: ardent nationalists), I see that bent being the stronger basis any pursuits in SE Asia, or Korea, for that matter,—they are really Chinese. FYI, it isn’t a rare occasion that I have heard this as it pertains to the Japanese, either.

Alot more ambition is contorted around ethnic unification than anything else, even to the point of colonization for later geographic incorporation.

or northward after a quebecois secession, which would split the maritimes from the rest of canada?

But over the longer term, if there is nothing inevitable or essential about geography (which I don’t think there is), then the more interesting question is under what conditions we can expect politicians to mobilize their populations utilizing a kind of ‘recovery’ rhetoric? As you note, there are a number of potential areas where this is likely to come into play in the future, specifically in various parts of Asia. It is an interesting question, and I don’t think we have a good answer…

Very wise words.