Geopolitical Temptation in Europe

Over the past two centuries, Europe has torn itself apart in a series of small wars and world wars. Most of these were the result of politicians’ lack of foresight and understanding of geopolitical realities. If we run back to Europe before the Napoleon’s conquests and the Congress of Vienna, we see a strong France and strong Russia and between them, a series of small weak states ripe for absorption and no concrete protections for them by existing powers.

Note: The black line represents where the German states begin and end, however, they were not united.

Europe before the Napoleon’s conquests

Though the French revolution was the most direct cause of French expansion, it would have been significantly more difficult had France had to fight a unified Germany. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Germany’s consolidation under Napoleon from a few hundred into 33 states did make some difference and the Austrian Empire was founded in 1804 as a reaction to the newly formed French Empire. Ultimately the situation was almost the same geographically. However, the leaders of Europe shared a conservative vision and appreiation of balance of power politics which was enough to maintain the new system for almost 100 years. Yet, as the map here clearly shows, Europe had limited options afterwards. Italy and Germany were long due for unification and the subsequent lack of buffer states would turn out to be deadly not to mention the vacuum created by the crumbling Ottoman empire.

Europe after the Congress of Vienna, 1815

Once both Italy and Germany were unified, there was little room left to maneuver on the continent. With two new players in the game, trouble was almost inevitable. New players mean new treaties to protect against new threats. The small limited wars Europeans had thusfar enjoyed became less and less likely. The shock of a not only new players, but that one of them (Germany) was quickly becoming stronger than the others almost guaranteed the tight alliance system which developed.

Pre-WWI Europe

After the First World War finished, statesmen failed to learn lessons from the Congress of Vienna which had dealt with a similar problem 100 years earlier. By not inviting the two strongest powers in Europe, Germany and Russia, to the peace, they could not have realistically expected them to honor it for very long. Post-WWI Europe looked suspiciously like the continent before the Napoleon’s conquests, a strong France and Russia with a weak central Europe consisting of a dozen or so fledling states, largely unprotected and some of whom were created on land wrongfully taken from Germany. It was only a matter of time before Germany would try to reunite despite French and Russian interest in maintaing a weak central european buffer zone.

Post-WWI Europe

As we all know, Germany did indeed move to retake its lost territory, however, what most people aren’t aware of, is that democratic Germany under Gustav Stresemann in the 1920s also aimed to do the same and had even clearly stated it.

Stresemann’s ultimate hope, as he once confessed to me, was: to free the Rhineland, to recover Eupen-Malmedy, and the Saar, to perfect Austria’s Anschluss, and to have, under mandate or otherwise, an African colony where essentialy tropical raw materials could be secured and an outlet created for the surplus energy of the younger generation.

Like Bismarck, his premature departure from German politics created a very dangerous situation.Whether the Nazis rose or not, Germany would have retaken most of its lost territory. Stresemann aimed to manage Germany’s peaceful reemergence by negotiating the Versailles treaty away and then, when Germany was powerful enough, demanding back what was rightfully German. Hitler simply had no patience.

What does this little trip in the wayback machine tell us? Geography has a much greater influence on politics than we may think and despite good intentions, and especially economic integration (idealized by people like Barnett as the solution to everything), factors such as geography or even a single politican may largely determine war and peace, regardless of what other actors do.

Thus, looking at today’s world map, one may ask, will Russia reconquer its lost territory in Central Asia? Will China expand northwards or perhaps into South East Asia? Could India reabsorb Bangladesh, Bhutan or Nepal? Will America expand southwards one day? Will synthetic countries like Bosnia and Afghanistan be split and reattached to their respective ethnic homelands? The answers to all these questions may seem quite clear today, but looking back, it would be unwise to think so. Though the nation-state may be in decline, the rise of political and economic blocks led by regional leaders may essentially repeat what we’ve seen above, though in the form of an EU, or Chinese-lead Asian Union for example. Only time will tell and until then, si vis pacem para bellum.