4GW and the Cuban Missile Crisis

4GW warriors?

President Kennedy’s masterful solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis was to “quarantine” Soviet ships enroute to Cuba. By limiting the level of violence of their own reaction the US succeeded in putting the ball of escalation into the Soviet court. This made any show of escalatory force by Krushschev catastrophic for Russia in the eyes of the world.

An analoguous situation is described by Col. Thomas X. Hammes in The Sling and Stone. Col Hammes argues that by avoiding the use of weapons other than stones during the first Intifada the Palestinians succeeded in transforming Israel “from the tiny, brave nation surrounded by hostile Arab nations to the oppressive state that condoned the killing of children in the street.” Kennedy was able to box the Soviets into a choice of either sacrificing their rhetorical defensive weapons in Cuba, or be viewed as the outright aggressor in the region. By offering weakness Kennedy asymmetrically annulled Krushchev’s strength.

In The Sling and Stone Col. Hammes asked how nations might use 4GW tactics against other nations, mentioning the book Unrestricted Warfare, authoured by two Chinese colonels outlining how China could fight the United States. I think the Cuban Missile crisis could be an example of state-on-state 4GW tactics.

During the Berlin crisis of 1961, Thomas Schelling advised President Kennedy that nuclear weapons should only be used “to impress the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war… not mainly to destroy tactical targets but to influence the Soviet command.” In other words, attack their mind, not their forces.

William S. Lind, father of 4GW, has stated that 4GW is decided on the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels. Yet he criticized Col. Hammes for saying that 4GW is used “to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”Â? Lind says that 4GW is more than just guerilla warfare:

In fact, Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents, that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is morally superior.

The line dividing moral and mental is a fine one, and complicates the definition of 4GW. By explicitly excluding attacks against the mental calculations of “political decision makers” the range of 4GW examples narrows significantly. Schelling’s advice no longer seems to be 4GW. The Cuban Missile “quarantine” seems to be one step before 4GW. If Krushchev did escalate, the US would have had the moral high ground. Kennedy allowed Krushchev to avoid this. Can this be considered as using the threat of 4GW?

There are numerous examples throughout history of powers using asymmetrical tactics against other powers (eg. the Pericles’ plan at the outset of the Peloponnesian War). What makes these not 4GW?