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	<title>Comments on: On War in the 21st&#160;Century</title>
	<atom:link href="http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/</link>
	<description>Speak Victorian, Think Pagan</description>
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		<title>By: Pacific Empire &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Counterinsurgency resources</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-171148</link>
		<dc:creator>Pacific Empire &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Counterinsurgency resources</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2006 03:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-171148</guid>
		<description>[...] Hammes&#8217; own The Sling and the Stone is an excellent introduction to fourth-generation warfare. Here is the Coming Anarchy review, and the DNI review. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Hammes&#8217; own The Sling and the Stone is an excellent introduction to fourth-generation warfare. Here is the Coming Anarchy review, and the <span class="caps">DNI </span>review. [...]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: ComingAnarchy.com &#187; Blog Archive &#187; LIC and COIN resources</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-170487</link>
		<dc:creator>ComingAnarchy.com &#187; Blog Archive &#187; LIC and COIN resources</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Nov 2006 16:01:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-170487</guid>
		<description>[...] USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone (which I reviewed previously) gives an overview of some must-read resources on insurgency/counter-insurgency. You&#8217;ll notice that though the classics (Mao, Galula) are there, there are also a number of newer resources listed. COIN is definitely one of the &#8220;sexy&#8221; topics in military academia now (the other being terrorism). The learning environment in US Army is finally becoming more open to the study small and unconventional warfare (I have heard more than one US Army officer say we have LT Gen David Petraeus to thank for this sea change.) Nowadays it seems like everyone is getting in on it. For those that are interested in learning more, Hammes&#8217; list provides a good foundation those starting out in the field.      What say you? [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] <span class="caps">USMC</span> Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone (which I reviewed previously) gives an overview of some must-read resources on insurgency/counter-insurgency. You&#8217;ll notice that though the classics (Mao, Galula) are there, there are also a number of newer resources listed. <span class="caps">COIN </span>is definitely one of the &#8220;sexy&#8221; topics in military academia now (the other being terrorism). The learning environment in US Army is finally becoming more open to the study small and unconventional warfare (I have heard more than one US Army officer say we have LT Gen David Petraeus to thank for this sea change.) Nowadays it seems like everyone is getting in on it. For those that are interested in learning more, Hammes&#8217; list provides a good foundation those starting out in the field.      What say you? [...]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: ComingAnarchy.com &#187; Blog Archive &#187; 4GW and the Cuban Missile Crisis</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-32809</link>
		<dc:creator>ComingAnarchy.com &#187; Blog Archive &#187; 4GW and the Cuban Missile Crisis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Oct 2005 20:07:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-32809</guid>
		<description>[...] An analoguous situation is described by Col. Thomas X. Hammes in The Sling and Stone. Col Hammes argues that by avoiding the use of weapons other than stones during the first Intifada the Palestinians succeeded in transforming Israel &#8220;from the tiny, brave nation surrounded by hostile Arab nations to the oppressive state that condoned the killing of children in the street.&#8221; Kennedy was able to box the Soviets into a choice of either sacrificing their rhetorical defensive weapons in Cuba, or be viewed as the outright aggressor in the region. By offering weakness Kennedy assymetrically annulled Krushchev&#8217;s strength. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] An analoguous situation is described by Col. Thomas X. Hammes in The Sling and Stone. Col Hammes argues that by avoiding the use of weapons other than stones during the first Intifada the Palestinians succeeded in transforming Israel &#8220;from the tiny, brave nation surrounded by hostile Arab nations to the oppressive state that condoned the killing of children in the street.&#8221; Kennedy was able to box the Soviets into a choice of either sacrificing their rhetorical defensive weapons in Cuba, or be viewed as the outright aggressor in the region. By offering weakness Kennedy assymetrically annulled Krushchev&#8217;s strength. [...]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: lirelou</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-30756</link>
		<dc:creator>lirelou</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2005 05:39:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-30756</guid>
		<description>Reference your comment on Mao and Michael Collins. My own reading of Mao was that he studied more Von Clausewitz than anything else (though he obviously paid lip service to Sun Tsu). I haven&#039;t read the book, but must confess to a strong bias against the latest snappy definition for insurgent and partisan warfare. Remember, the first three letters of assymetric warfare stand for ---! Beyond the &quot;Seven Pillars of Wisdom&quot; and Lidell-Hart&#039;s &quot;Colonel Lawrence&quot;, my favorite work on the subject is Jean Pouget&#039;s &quot;Bataillon R.A.S.&quot;, which is his account of his year as a battalion commander running a sector in Southern Algeria. Pouget was Larteguy&#039;s model for Philippe Esclavier in &quot;The Centurions&quot;, and the one to whom the book was dedicated. Not available in English.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reference your comment on Mao and Michael Collins. My own reading of Mao was that he studied more Von Clausewitz than anything else (though he obviously paid lip service to Sun Tsu). I haven&#8217;t read the book, but must confess to a strong bias against the latest snappy definition for insurgent and partisan warfare. Remember, the first three letters of assymetric warfare stand for &#8212;! Beyond the &#8220;Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#8221; and Lidell-Hart&#8217;s &#8220;Colonel Lawrence&#8221;, my favorite work on the subject is Jean Pouget&#8217;s &#8220;Bataillon <span class="caps">R.A.S.</span>&#8220;, which is his account of his year as a battalion commander running a sector in Southern Algeria. Pouget was Larteguy&#8217;s model for Philippe Esclavier in &#8220;The Centurions&#8221;, and the one to whom the book was dedicated. Not available in English.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Eddie</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-30180</link>
		<dc:creator>Eddie</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 22:47:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-30180</guid>
		<description>Younghusband, in the Navy, we are (supposedly) transitioning to a 360 degree evaluation system within another year or so.  (one reform, at least in the navy). 

I have read about recent training in the Army and Marines where troops preparing to deploy to Iraq face off against facilitators acting as insurgents, (assasinating village leaders, blackmailing civilians, inflitrating local police, committing sabotage against economic infrastructure, etc etc).  Isn&#039;t this improved training for 4GW?

I agree with you that his suggestions were rather general at times, especially in regards to HUMINT (have there been any specific suggestions of late that were worthwhile?).

Now as far as the officer ranks go, there are far too many officers across the board, especially in the Navy.  Too many low-level positions that could be filled by senior enlisted (who are quite adept at handling dual, even triple hats for roles) and far too many high-level positions that are continually filled by officers that should be out in the field (or in the Navy, out to sea).

How would reforming the officer corps eval process make the problem worse?  The current seems like an archaic system that doesn&#039;t work so well in the 21st century....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Younghusband, in the Navy, we are (supposedly) transitioning to a 360 degree evaluation system within another year or so.  (one reform, at least in the navy). </p>

<p>I have read about recent training in the Army and Marines where troops preparing to deploy to Iraq face off against facilitators acting as insurgents, (assasinating village leaders, blackmailing civilians, inflitrating local police, committing sabotage against economic infrastructure, etc etc).  Isn&#8217;t this improved training for 4GW?</p>

<p>I agree with you that his suggestions were rather general at times, especially in regards to <span class="caps">HUMINT </span>(have there been any specific suggestions of late that were worthwhile?).</p>

<p>Now as far as the officer ranks go, there are far too many officers across the board, especially in the Navy.  Too many low-level positions that could be filled by senior enlisted (who are quite adept at handling dual, even triple hats for roles) and far too many high-level positions that are continually filled by officers that should be out in the field (or in the Navy, out to sea).</p>

<p>How would reforming the officer corps eval process make the problem worse?  The current seems like an archaic system that doesn&#8217;t work so well in the 21st century&#8230;.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Sunguh5307</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-30166</link>
		<dc:creator>Sunguh5307</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 21:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-30166</guid>
		<description>4GW is crap.   It&#039;s over-intellectualized abstract nonsense from some bureaucratic-oriented staffer.  I&#039;ll take Kaplan anyday.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>4GW is crap.   It&#8217;s over-intellectualized abstract nonsense from some bureaucratic-oriented staffer.  I&#8217;ll take Kaplan anyday.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Gollios</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-30052</link>
		<dc:creator>Gollios</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 14:12:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-30052</guid>
		<description>Kaplan talks a great deal about military organization in his latest book.  His take is that the more powered down the organization and the smaller the footprint the more effective military action is.  Officers and Noncoms and the ground level should be given enough leway to use their own judgement.  The reorganization needed is indeed stripping away layers of beauracracy...not changing the career officer corps.  He actually thought that the military was prooving to be a very loyal and effective &#039;caste.&#039;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kaplan talks a great deal about military organization in his latest book.  His take is that the more powered down the organization and the smaller the footprint the more effective military action is.  Officers and Noncoms and the ground level should be given enough leway to use their own judgement.  The reorganization needed is indeed stripping away layers of beauracracy&#8230;not changing the career officer corps.  He actually thought that the military was prooving to be a very loyal and effective &#8216;caste.&#8217;</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Younghusband</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-30046</link>
		<dc:creator>Younghusband</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 12:55:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-30046</guid>
		<description>I found these suggestions to be pretty vague and broad, which was a different tone from the academic specificity of the earlier chapters. 

He wants more realistic training by building huge training centers and engaging in 4GW gaming. What would this look like? He just finished explaining that 4GW is this broad sociopolitical struggle that takes decades, so I was hoping he would give us a description of the game. 

I like his point that he makes about the organization of the military not changing for over 100 years, while everything around it has changed. He wants to reform performance evaluation to make it more comprehensive, thus we will have a less career-entrenched officer core. I don&#039;t think this can be effective in clearing up the horrible bureaucracy, and in fact will exacerbate it. Email has just added to the confustion, regardless of CBIRF&#039;s experience. And if you make intel just &quot;there&quot; for the taking, who will take it?

He calls for more HUMINT, but again, no explanation to how this will look.

Other suggestions I think are spot on, such as moving away from heavy  forces to more medium-weight forces and longer tours.

Maybe if he had more room or dedicated more of the book to explore these suggestions I would have been satisfied. Hammes himself wrote several times thoughout that this &quot;just scratches the surface.&quot; The book went from GENERAL to SPECIFIC, and back to GENERAL again.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I found these suggestions to be pretty vague and broad, which was a different tone from the academic specificity of the earlier chapters. </p>

<p>He wants more realistic training by building huge training centers and engaging in 4GW gaming. What would this look like? He just finished explaining that 4GW is this broad sociopolitical struggle that takes decades, so I was hoping he would give us a description of the game. </p>

<p>I like his point that he makes about the organization of the military not changing for over 100 years, while everything around it has changed. He wants to reform performance evaluation to make it more comprehensive, thus we will have a less career-entrenched officer core. I don&#8217;t think this can be effective in clearing up the horrible bureaucracy, and in fact will exacerbate it. Email has just added to the confustion, regardless of <span class="caps">CBIRF&#8217;</span>s experience. And if you make intel just &#8220;there&#8221; for the taking, who will take it?</p>

<p>He calls for more <span class="caps">HUMINT, </span>but again, no explanation to how this will look.</p>

<p>Other suggestions I think are spot on, such as moving away from heavy  forces to more medium-weight forces and longer tours.</p>

<p>Maybe if he had more room or dedicated more of the book to explore these suggestions I would have been satisfied. Hammes himself wrote several times thoughout that this &#8220;just scratches the surface.&#8221; The book went from <span class="caps">GENERAL </span>to <span class="caps">SPECIFIC, </span>and back to <span class="caps">GENERAL </span>again.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Eddie</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-29941</link>
		<dc:creator>Eddie</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 04:15:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-29941</guid>
		<description>I just finished reading this.  I found it highly interesting save for the 4GW confusion you wrote about, and really think the strongest point of the book is its ending with its suggestions for reforming the military (i.e. more realistic training, clearing up the officer ranks, longer tours, etc etc).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I just finished reading this.  I found it highly interesting save for the 4GW confusion you wrote about, and really think the strongest point of the book is its ending with its suggestions for reforming the military (i.e. more realistic training, clearing up the officer ranks, longer tours, etc etc).</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: tdaxp</title>
		<link>http://cominganarchy.com/2005/09/22/on-war-in-the-21st-century/comment-page-1/#comment-29936</link>
		<dc:creator>tdaxp</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2005 04:00:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cominganarchy.com/?p=1129#comment-29936</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Around the Blogosphere&lt;/strong&gt;

Barnett and Don blog the same thing.
Jeremiah ponders the Eastern Way of War.  Certainly worthwhile after this dribble.
Mark Safranski is scary smart.
Nellie Lide learns lessons from the Indian Army
Younghusband reviews The Sling and the Stone

A...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Around the Blogosphere</strong></p>

<p>Barnett and Don blog the same thing.<br />
Jeremiah ponders the Eastern Way of War.  Certainly worthwhile after this dribble.<br />
Mark Safranski is scary smart.<br />
Nellie Lide learns lessons from the Indian Army<br />
Younghusband reviews The Sling and the Stone</p>

<p><span class="caps">A&#8230;</span></p>]]></content:encoded>
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