Colonel Thomas X. Hammes’ The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century is a highly accessible book on 4th generation warfare (4GW) that goes above and beyond abstract definitions, applying generational warfare theory to actual modern day conflicts.
The first four chapters provide an introduction to the 1st through 4th generations of warfare: manpower, firepower, maneouver and netwar, respectively. Col. Hammes argues that there is an evolution to warfare, and changes in the political, economic, social and technological segments of society impact on that evolution. The middle chapters of the book give examples of 4GW in action, using conflicts from the 20th and 21st centuries. The final sections of the book provide recommendations for new directions in force structure with examples of where the US military is doing things right, and where it is doing things wrong.
The Reason
Why did Col. Hammes endeavour to write such a book? On one hand I think it was an academic instinct to define a certain sociological phenomenon, and bring the debate to a wider audience. On the other, it is apparent that Col. Hammes is a critic of the so-called revolution in miliary affairs (RMA), network-central warfare and in particular the Joint Vision 2010 /2020 documents, and wanted to speak out.
The Good
The strength of this book is Col. Hammes’ ability to illustrate his theory in modern day conflicts, explaining how certain insurgencies failed or succeeded in terms of the 4GW paradigm. He covers Mao, Viet Nam, the Sandanistas, the Intifadas, Al Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq. More than any explicit definition of 4GW these case studies give the reader concrete examples to implicitly learn the principles and concepts involved. The book is worth it for these chapters alone.
The Bad
Besides not being a particularly well-written book (or maybe that is the fault of the editors), there are a few complaints as to the content. Armchair Generalist disagrees with his views of terrorist CBRN incidents and how the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force is the model for such military response. I also wasn’t particularly convinced of his propositions to make the government more “flexible.” Hammes’ has some pretty solid work in the middle (see “The Good”) but I think he finishes weak in that his roadmap for change isn’t very concrete.
The Ugly
One of the modern 4GW heavyweights, William S. Lind commented on The Sling and Stone, saying:
He makes a major error early, in that he equates Fourth Generation war with insurgency. In doing so, he equates the Fourth Generation with how war is fought. It is usually fought guerilla-style, but that misses the point: what changes in the Fourth Generation is who fights and what they fight for. This error leads to others, such as believing that Fourth Generation war focuses on the mental level. Hammes writes, “The fourth generation has arrived. It uses all available networks ““ political, economic, social and military ““ to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”Â? In fact, Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents, that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is morally superior. It turns its state enemies inward against themselves on the moral level, making the political calculations of the mental level irrelevant.
Hammes himself describes how certain nation states (China) are exploring ways of using 4GW against other states. This will obviously not take the form of an insurgency.
Secondly, Hammes states that 4GW started with Mao. But we know that Mao studied the guerilla techniques of the Irish (eg. Michael Collins). According to one of my War Studies profs, you can find evidence of 4GW in Thucydides (which I am currently reading, and will report back to Coming Anarchy later).
The Conclusion
Despite a possible fundamental misunderstanding of theory, and a potential oversight of historical evidence, I think Col. Hammes has produced a commendable work that is definitely worth reading. The Sling and the Stone gives a practical overview of 4GW, and even contributes to the overall literature by integrating Boyd’s OODA loop into the mix. Ultimately, this cannot be considered a 4GW “manual,” but when read alongside other sources I believe it can be a valuable asset, particularly in terms of 4GW conflict analysis.
Finally, here are some Sling & Stone related links:

Comments to this entry
tdaxp
September 22, 2005
4:00 am
Barnett and Don blog the same thing.
Jeremiah ponders the Eastern Way of War. Certainly worthwhile after this dribble.
Mark Safranski is scary smart.
Nellie Lide learns lessons from the Indian Army
Younghusband reviews The Sling and the Stone
A...
Eddie
September 22, 2005
4:15 am
Younghusband
September 22, 2005
12:55 pm
He wants more realistic training by building huge training centers and engaging in 4GW gaming. What would this look like? He just finished explaining that 4GW is this broad sociopolitical struggle that takes decades, so I was hoping he would give us a description of the game.
I like his point that he makes about the organization of the military not changing for over 100 years, while everything around it has changed. He wants to reform performance evaluation to make it more comprehensive, thus we will have a less career-entrenched officer core. I don't think this can be effective in clearing up the horrible bureaucracy, and in fact will exacerbate it. Email has just added to the confustion, regardless of CBIRF's experience. And if you make intel just "there" for the taking, who will take it?
He calls for more HUMINT, but again, no explanation to how this will look.
Other suggestions I think are spot on, such as moving away from heavy forces to more medium-weight forces and longer tours.
Maybe if he had more room or dedicated more of the book to explore these suggestions I would have been satisfied. Hammes himself wrote several times thoughout that this "just scratches the surface." The book went from GENERAL to SPECIFIC, and back to GENERAL again.
Gollios
September 22, 2005
2:12 pm
Sunguh5307
September 22, 2005
9:56 pm
Eddie
September 22, 2005
10:47 pm
I have read about recent training in the Army and Marines where troops preparing to deploy to Iraq face off against facilitators acting as insurgents, (assasinating village leaders, blackmailing civilians, inflitrating local police, committing sabotage against economic infrastructure, etc etc). Isn't this improved training for 4GW?
I agree with you that his suggestions were rather general at times, especially in regards to HUMINT (have there been any specific suggestions of late that were worthwhile?).
Now as far as the officer ranks go, there are far too many officers across the board, especially in the Navy. Too many low-level positions that could be filled by senior enlisted (who are quite adept at handling dual, even triple hats for roles) and far too many high-level positions that are continually filled by officers that should be out in the field (or in the Navy, out to sea).
How would reforming the officer corps eval process make the problem worse? The current seems like an archaic system that doesn't work so well in the 21st century....
lirelou
September 26, 2005
5:39 am
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