Comments on: No American pastime for you Komrade!

By: mark safranski

mark safranski — Thu, 22 Sep 2005 03:43:04 +0000

This book sounds more and more like a future purchase ;o)

The French were good at that tactic overseas because they were first good at it at home – recall the employment of ” The Mobiles” against French civilians ?

By: Younghusband

Younghusband — Thu, 22 Sep 2005 01:25:11 +0000

Very interesting points Lirelou. I have no idea if there is any thought on that. Will look into it.

By: lirelou

lirelou — Thu, 22 Sep 2005 00:29:24 +0000

Look’s like an interesting book. I’ll abuse this post to throw out an idea related to counterintellgience. The French were masters of recruiting locals into their public security and combat efforts. These units were usually termed “partisans” or “suppletifs”. It reached its height in Indochina (with the Commando forces, see Pissardy’s “Commandos Nord Vietnam”) and Algeria, where virtually every unit recruited and trained a partisan or commando unit, often from among captured ALN fighters. The British also used similar methods in Kenya (the “countergangs”), as did the Rhodesians within the Selous Scouts. The American Army has tried such methods, but appears to lack a doctrine for their recruitment, organization, training, and employment, other than the general special forces mission of “unconventional warfare”. The War on Terror would appear to offer ample opportunity for the employment of such methods and units. I wonder if they are being tried?

By: Younghusband

Younghusband — Wed, 21 Sep 2005 14:54:12 +0000

Mark,

The rest of that chapter mainly discusses the difference between Cold War intel and post-Cold War intel, highlighting the problems that we currently face. Some of the things it compares are:

Indications and warning
Support to arms control
Political analysis
Economic analysis
Intel support to mil forces
LIC-COIN
Threat comparison (conventional, traditional terror, CW/BW)

It compares each of these in a table format. It is by no means comprehensive, but simply illustrates just the beginning of problems.

Basically it breaks down to this: before, all we had to do was watch the big old Soviet Union plunder along in a predictable manner. Now all hell has broken loose.

By: mark safranski

mark safranski — Tue, 20 Sep 2005 03:13:27 +0000

Hi YH,

First, a brief request: I’d be keenly interested in a follow up if you hit any good parts on the problems of counterintelligence worth passing on.

As for this post:

The author, I think, is quite correct. The USSR was a extremely secretive and intentionally opaque adversary. That being said, the maniacal centralization of decision-making and procedure made Soviet behavioral patterns notoriously conspicuous and thus, not so hard to read when something ” secret” was going on and the ” secret” thing’s relative importance.

Our current foe is ultra-decentralized and adept at hiding in plain sight and while lacking in resources, he is also far more difficult to penetrate. It’s far more likely that al qaida has a plant inside the DIA or CIA than the reverse.