The Cardinal’s website often refers to recently published books. One was ‘The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course’, by the president of the Council for Foreign Relations.

A reviewer says: “There is really no alternative to multilateralism, as the Bush Administration is finding out in its second term. . . In a globalizing world of cross-border flows of people, goods, money, ideas, viruses, weapons, etc., global integration is taking place no matter how desparately nations try to hold on to sovereignty.”

Considering that its a dying continent, there seems to be quite the burden to show that Europe/EU is a model for anything…

i.e. hegemony/1GE at the world level is analagous to authoritarian/dictator at the state level, small states analogous to people (or subunits such as county, or states insdie a federation)

so there are 2 models:
1) 2GE such as a benign hegemony like USA
2) 3GE in the model of some modification of EU (perhaps a lot of modifications), basically “democracy” at the world level.

The fundamental difference is that this 3GE would incorporate/absorb other small state in a manner that gives the same right and contribution to these new members. and such absorption is also done in a non-violence process.

now whether 3GE is practical (UN is not really working, and people are skeptical of EU), or do we need 2GE as a transition to 3GE in up to debate.

the implication (if we believe in such structure): does the US need to adopt the EU strategy, by absorbing central/south american stated into the federation to compete with EU? or simply join EU?

Dinesh D’Souza “Two Cheers for Colonialism”

Andrew Bacevich “Imperial Tense”

But what you seem to be talking about is a ‘Liberal International Economic Order’, of the sort fashioned by the British. This, anyhow, is the case that Deepak Lal is trying to make in his book ‘In Defense of Empires’ which I strongly recommend.

But don’t get wrapped around the terminology. That is what everyone is selling ‘4/5GW or asymmetrical warfare, globalization- it’s all been done before. Just open up the classics- Thucydides, Plutarch, etc… it’s all there.

21st century technology and economics can mask or muffle the blow like a ‘velvet glove’, but it still requires an iron fist to make it happen. That doesn’t mean it’s a bad thing- you won’t find me complaining along the lines of some neo-Marxist global immiseration anti-imperialist nonsense, but in the effort of continuing this dialogue I don’t wish to delude myself of the costs.

And then we come to Iraq…

Yes, I am enjoying the discussion. But I don’t know if empires really have the undeserved bad rap you think it does. Certainly the Roman empire is widely acknowledged to be an agent that furthered cultural and technological advancement. I think empires are kind of like mergers in business. Some are amazingly successful, yet many others are nothing more than the result of desperation and misplaced ambition that results in AOL-Time-Warner-esq lumbering behemouths that are encumbered rather than strengthened by their additions. Too often successful examples are blindly copied while the mistakes of the failures too seldem contemplated.

As for why people (including myself) usually take to moral disapproval of empire building tactics, the answer is twofold. Firstly, we live in America, a country that could never have reached its current prominence without breaking from the British empire and embracing democracy. It seems hypocritical somehow to now seek to augment our own empire. This is why we seek to shield our activities behind the veil of “spreading democracy.” In my opinion, this does a little to improve our moral standing, but also strikes a fatal blow towards out ability to effectively build empires. What would we do with a democratically elected rabidly fundamentalist Iran-friendly shiite government in Iraq? From a further historical perspective, the world is rife with countries that are still suffering from the malignant aftereffects of colonial rule. Iraq itself is a good example, as is the genocide in Rwanda and the continued economic malaise many Latin American countries.

Secondly, in criticizing the actions of a moral agent, the intentions matter along with the outcome. Let’s say I robbed a child of his lollipop. And lets say that we somehow know that the action turned out to be a positive for the child because that lollipop would have caused a painful cavity. I cannot get credit for that long-term benefit because all I took into account in making my decision was the fact that I wanted the lollipop and the child cannot put up an adequate defense of it. Same with the after-the-fact justifications of the U.S. in the invasions of Iraq and Afgahnistan as humanitarian missions.

And to answer your question, Coming Anarchy is the name of an article/book by Robert Kaplan (see here for more). The three contributors here, from the US and Canada, each living in different countries, use this as a forum to write about world affairs, geopolitics, and other relevant (and occasionaly not so relevant) issues.

As for empire, perhaps the only way to stop the coming anarchy is an organizing power, with the US in the lead. Sure, empires are entirely interested in their own development — but so everyone else. Empires often have productive side elements which are too often overlooked, and by the amount of comments and trackbacks, it would look as if many people are enjoying it as well.

“All Roads Lead to Rome,” by Jeff Vail, A Theory of Power: Jeff Vail’s Critique of Hierarchy & Empire, 5 October 2004, http://www.jeffvail.net/2004/10/all-roads-lead-to-rome.html.

The blogosphere is abuzz with empires. Chirol started it by talki…

As for the Jew’s comments, don’t dismiss it out of hand. He makes points through snark. It’s his MO. In your case, I suppose a translation of his best point into serious mode would be “You seem to be cherry-picking characteristics of the most successful empires and then touting their success as a reason why projecting power outwards (either militarily or through other means of influence) is a good thing. I don’t think that is valid and you are begging the question.”

As for myself, I’m all for a Gun Germs and Steel style amoral probe into the pattern of historical development, and it is indeed fascinating to me whether the Mongols, despite their bad PR, actually dragged the Europeans kicking and screaming into modernizing. But I’m afraid that your line of thinking might slip into a kind of invisible hand-ish argument that though each empire only acted for the sake of its own dominion, the unintended consequence is improved trade and a technology transfer that generally raise and not lower the welfare of humanity. Therefore we should give our own power-hungriness full rein. In my opinion that would be a false conclusion indeed.

Yes, I’m aware that you never actually make the connection to the united state’s current quest for empire, but lets face it, a discussion like this does not exist in a vacuum.

Thanks for the great answers!

To continue the discussion:

2. Many writers, including Barnett, have openly discussed a double standard in international relations — Core treat other Core countries to very different standards that they treat those in the Gap. For just on example, Libya, Pakistan, and North Korea heard no end of complains about their nuclear program. However, Japan is at most weeks away from a weapon and Brazil might be working on one too.

So my question on a double-headed is if the US or the “Core” is a 2GE in the Core and a 1GE in the Gap.

4. I agree with Mark. However, I asked that question because that is William Lind’s test to see if something is a “generation” (from ZP).

New South Dakota Blog: The Jim River Report

It’s like Google News and Drudge report for South Dakota

It’s still a “beta,” but I think it has potential. Check it out.

Over at Coming Anarchy, Chirol as written A History of Empires: Par…

TheJew: We’d firstly appreciate if you’d try to formulate your comments in a more intelligent way and back up your alternative theory with more evidence. I highly doubt any of the above commentors would classify great empires like Athens, Rome, or even the US who’ve contributed the most to civilization as “shitty.” Constructive comments please!

Dan: I hope I made clear that though violence was not the driving force for 2GE’s, it still plays a role. I should probably have added some graphics I considered on the subject.

Imagine one big arrow going into a country, and inside it are economics, politics, culture etc. The big arrow is violence.

Then imagine for 2GE the arrows going separately into the example country with force lurking in the background as say a dark cloud which occasionally fires off a lightning bolt when necessary.

I wouldn’t say a 2GE is totally reliant on soft power, but rather it uses that as its main weapon and force as its backup. As to your questions.

1) I was rather thinking of it as a development, just as mankind was slowly tamed its wilder side, so too have empires and thus I was’t thinking of it as pre-imperial. In my mind, I was trying to describe the development of previous empires into what they are today (US, UK, France, Spain etc). But your historical examples also call that into question. I’d perhaps divide 2GE’s into those who still maintain hard power and those without it.

2) I wouldn’t say simultaneously. I’ve long thought little of the debate between Realism and Liberalism (and its variants) because teh Core and the Gap run on different systems so each school of though works well in its own system and not in the other. THe main point is that Empires and humans in general, are now at a point where they would RATHER do good than bad (i.e. not use force) as long as its convenient. That’s the major development.

3) Interesting question. Something along those lines. I’ll have to think about that one.

4) See Mark’s later comment.

I wish I had my copy of Norwich handy but I believe Venetian behavior in the sack of Constantinople had much to do with the personal ambitions of the mercurial and blind Doge and less state interest of Venice per se.

The Venetian Republic pacified the eastern Adriatic by 1200. In the early Crusades she was trading with both sides. Perhaps the 4th Crusade is the point where she morphed from 2GE to 1GE?

And smashing the navies of its competitors, arranging for the sack of Constantinople, and so forth. By the Renaissance, the Venetians were often viewed as one of the most expansionist polities of Europe, and for good reason. There are amusing exchanges between Spanish and Venetian diplomats on this point.

“Can a state be simultaneously a 2GE and 1GE? I’m thinking of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, Victorian Britain, or the modern United Staes. Each relied on hard power in dealing with the Non-Integrating Gap while used soft power internally and with other countries in its Core, and a mix with its “integrating Gap.”Â?

I think Dan is on the mark here; the distinction between 1GE and 2GE Chirol’s drawing might be useful as an ideal type, but it doesn’t track very well with historical changes, except to the extent that post-decolonization ‘empires,’ such as the Soviet and the US, have been informal.

More commentary later at my blog.

1) How is your notion of 2GE different from conventional notions of hegemonic orders?
2) In social and political systems, the kinds of ties your discuss involve bidirectional influence. Along with distinctions between “coverage” and, for example, density and strength of ties in a network, this makes me wonder: why is coverage a simple proxy for power?

Apologies for a rambling reply.

If I am reading correctly, you define a 2nd Generation Empire as

• Economics, not war, as the strongest connecting force
• A tradition of voluntary ruleset importation
• Reliance on “soft power” (culture, economic ties, etc) instead of “hard power” (projection of force)

Obviously, the European Union would fit this definition of 2GE. But such an entity is not new. The early Republic of Venice would be a 2GE. Created as a union of several small islands, the early Republic was a martime state that thrived on soft communication. Trusted as merchants by both Crusaders and Muslims, the Republic extended her influence throughout the Mediterranean. The Republic would come to the height of her power projecting security through the Adriatic and parts of the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Eventually, the “2GE” Republic would evolve into a run-of-the-mill state fighting land wars on her doorstep. Machiavelli commented unfavorably on the wisdom of this change of strategy.

Other “2GEs” can also be found, but only lasted for a short time — the Latin League, the United States of America, the United Provinces of Central America, and the United Provinces of the Netherlands were all formed voluntarily and originally relied on soft power. This rarely worked as a long term strategy however The sunset of the American 2GE was probably 1789 (the replacement of the Articles of Confederation) or 1794 (President Washington crushing the Whiskey Rebellion). UPCA simply cracked up. Netherlands may have the best record as a 2GE, with a strong tradition of liberalism at home mixed with a strong tradition of exporting security over the ocean.

These examples raise a few questions

1. Does “2GE” an evolution from 1GE, or the reverse? Might 2GE really be 0GE, or “pre-Imperial Empire”? Might there be no pattern?
2. Can a state be simultaneously a 2GE and 1GE? I’m thinking of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, Victorian Britain, or the modern United Staes. Each relied on hard power in dealing with the Non-Integrating Gap while used soft power internally and with other countries in its Core, and a mix with its “integrating Gap.”
3. Is the PNM vision be a bontinent-spanning “2nd Generation Empire” (the US) leading through soft power a Core-spanning “2nd Generation Empire” (Barnett’s “Global Star Chamber”) leading through soft and hard power a World-spanning “1st Generation Empire.”
4. #3 has strong parrllells to the levels of Empire under Sovietism — the Imperial RSFSR leading the Imperial USSR leading the imperial Warsaw Pact. Of course multiple levels of federalism might be a component of many Empires.
4. Absent a vast disparity in size, will a 2GE defeat a 1GE? What would even be meant by “defeat”?

Thanks for the great post!

1) [Militarily] Successful countries/cultures (empires) are always [militarily] successful. They are therefore assigned the normative value “good”Â?.
2) They spread their goodness by conquest.
3) This spread of goodness leads to greater global trade.

An alternate theory:

1) Shitty states need to become belligerent in order to distract the masses from the corruption and incompetence of the elites.
2) Shit spreads through violence.
3) Eventually the inefficient system that lead the original country to vent its pressures outwards runs out of outwards. The societal turmoil covered up by conquest reemerges and destroys the society.

Exempli gratia: Russian Revolution, French Revolution (if Napoleon stayed out of Russia), Athens, Hitler, Rome (arguably), Persia, Egypt, Spain, and the Aztecs.

And now an incomplete list of empires that are not included above:

Indus
Sumeria-Akkad
Egypt
Shang
Babylon
Mitanni
Hittite
Zhao
Assyrian
Phonecia (Tyre)
Medes
Chaldea
Lydia
Achaemenid
Qin-Han
Parthia
Kushan
Mayan
Sassanid
Tang
Jin
Song
Ming
Aztec
Inca
Later Jin

I particularly liked your neat summative:

“Great empires don’t compete against other systems per se, they strive to become “the system.”Â?

I’ll be happy to post on this one, the historiography of empire is a long, fascinating and deeply politicized one. I’m sure Dan will post as well as Dan Nexion of Duck of Minerva ( I’m kinda hoping he does, the diplomatic historian in me enjoys batting IR theorists about the ears ;o) j/k)