This was going to be a comment elsewhere but was just too darn long. So here goes: where Barnett gets Kaplan, China, and the new world order wrong. And since Star Wars references seem to be the order of the day… let the duel commence!
What Newsweek recently did in its story on interrogations was the journalistic equivalent of yelling “fire” in a crowed theater. People died as a result, and they should answer for this professionally. What Kaplan does in the Atlantic Monthly piece is, in my opinion, basically the same thing—only in slow motion, so to speak. Fear-mongering and war-mongering is reprehensible and morally wrong.
(Brushing over my disagreement on Newsweek…) Fearmongering? Preparation. The best way to prevent war with China is to prepare for one. God forbid it ever comes to a shooting match because it will be one bloody mess, but if China tries to pull a Kuwait on Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia, Siberia, or the Pacific isles, we want to be armed to the teeth and ready for anything. And, the threat of an American challenge will get China to back off.
I wonder if many of the “China Doves” have been outside Beijing, Shanghai, or Hong Kong to hear what lots of future Chinese voters think. College students spray bile about Japan in an inarticulable rage. Civil engineers tell me over beers how they long for a chance to kick the US’s fanny. And an educated, rational acquaintance born and raised in Hong Kong with no love for the Communist government nonetheless does not hesitate to say, “I would die to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.” When I politely raise a counterpoint, that I know many Taiwanese who don’t want to be the same country, the response is eerily Anakin Skywalker-esque circa Episode II: “Then we should make them…”
These are the future elite—what about the peasants, farmers, and factory workers who are even more susceptible to xenophobic populism? I’ve seen a large swath of China from east to west. Much of the country is dirt, dirt poor. We’re talking no plumbing, no place to put mounds of trash, where transportation is a tricyle-motorcycle if you’re lucky and a crowded, smelly, unreliable bus if you don’t have private transport. Think those people aren’t going to want all the wealth in the West, Korea, and Japan? They’d snatch it up at a moments notice. The recent anti-Japan protests are just a taste of what could be the future. The potential is terrifying.
Instead, he’s just pushing the inevitability argument and trying to plant that seed in the minds of Americans: Get used to thinking about war with China!
Absolutely—think about it. Never stop. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
(Kaplan seems to have no understanding of global economics whatsoever, and seems very untroubled by that lack of understanding)
I’ll give him that one. But I think Dr. Barnett seems to have no understanding of human nature. Globalization, integration, elected governments, liberal democracy, integration and technology have not eliminated the desire in humanity to get hot-blooded and kill each other.
Some so-callled strategists simply revel in the notions of war and conflict and chaos and suffering, and I think Kaplan is one of them.
Perhaps. But the truth is that this debate is merely academic, and the unfolding reality of a new cold war is already upon us. What does Dr. Barnett say to Beijing’s moves in our back yard? 
China is cozying up to Chavez and others in Latin America the same way we’re moving the chess pieces in the Pacific. Or what about France and Japan? Paris is sticking their finger in our eye over arms sales and trade, while we’ve never had better relations with Tokyo. A recent commenter asked if other countries will want to jump on board a new Cold War order. They already have —with France, Japan, and Venezuala as the most recent examples. But that’s fine really—we want the pieces to regularly move and for the system to stay flexible, and for this Core to spread its influence to shrink the gap. Globalization is great.
But history ain’t over. Since Kissinger’s name has resurfaced on the site, allow me to recommend his book Diplomacy. Since Westphalia, the two historical instances of lasting peace between superpowers were 19th century Europe and the Cold War. Why? Flexible balances of power. The 19th century order ended in World War I when the balance calcified and both sides thought their victory was inevitable in a military struggle. And that is the real thing that worries me about Dr. Barnett’s China strategy: overconfidence. Not in America’s strength, but in China’s desire for peace and coexistence. Say what you will about Kaplan, he’s right in that measured pessimistic realism is the best way to prepare for the future.
Whadaya say Dr. Barnett? Care to engage those points based on a rational argument sans mention of my intelligence and illicit drugs? GO ON, I DARE YOU!
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Comments to this entry
Simon World
May 18, 2005
3:02 am
This time tomorrow I will be moved back to South Dakota. It's a good movie, but I'm kind of melancholy about it. I like this town, this job, this apartment. But upwards and onwards.... Japan: Commentators at Japundit are unimpressed with Koizumi's c...
Younghusband
May 18, 2005
4:25 am
Saru
May 18, 2005
4:58 am
Let me get this out of my system right away: pot, hash, heroin, coke, X, LSD, ludes, and 64 oz. of bong water!
Next, let me acknowledge that I would not continue to associate with you online or in the real world did I not respect your intellect, however much we find ourselves in disagreement.
So, before I refute your argument, I offer the opportunity to further elaborate on several points, as I may, depending on your rebuttal, wind up agreeing with you.
First, you wrote:
_...if China tries to pull a Kuwait on Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia, Siberia, or the Pacific isles..._
But you still fail to give a good justification as to _why_ China would try to pull such a stunt. I cannot accept as a reason that the CCP would do so simply because millions of poor Chinese would "snatch it up at a moment's notice."
If human nature is as you argue (again, not something I would be quick to disagree with you on) , and it is true as you say that,
_Globalization, integration, elected governments, liberal democracy, integration and technology have not eliminated the desire in humanity to get hot-blooded and kill each other._
then why hasn't the United States elected to simply wipe out China while we have the chance?
And as for China's moves in our backyard, we have been in their back yard for the better part of half a century in much greater force than they are, or can probably ever hope to be in ours. Still, we have not attacked them.
Is it that we desire peace and coexistence more than China? And if so, does this not refute your assertion about human nature? Is the United States an exception to the rule?
Catalin Tilimpea
May 18, 2005
5:08 am
The US does not intend to support Japan and Taiwan for the sake of liberty and the right of nations to self-determination. At least this should not be the reasons, realistically speaking. They support Japan and Taiwan militarily, as this currently does a good job at preventing the Chinese from ever achieving regional hegemony in South-West Asia. The final aim is that _no one_ achieves regional hegemony in SW Asia, not even Japan (which lacks the military muscle for that).
In my opinion, it is in the US interest that no country be a hegemon in this region, not because the US could achieve the position themselves ("no can do" really, because of inevitably inefficient force projection over the Pacific), but because such a country would be "unhindered" by local enemies and free to challenge American interests elsewhere in the world.
Eddie Beaver
May 18, 2005
5:28 am
China may invade Taiwan one day because of a bad series of missteps and misreadings of the always festering relations between the two nations.
China's present government is not responsible to its people, there are no real elections and balance of power within the government. What, within their own nation, is to stop a small group of dictators from taking Siberia from a weak Russia? Their domestic cost would be next to nil for such a move, in fact it could be wildly supported.
Contrast that with the reaction of the democratic populations of Germany, Japan or America if they suddenly seized another nation's holding or an entire country. The leadership there would very likely collapse under the condemnation and overwhelming opposition. These countries and many others have essentially renounced territorial expansion by force.
Has China?
America has always been an exception to the rule in the 20th century and likely in the 21st century. This is our international system, very similar to the one we inherited from the British in the 19th century, an international system based on trade and stability. It isn't perfect, it hasn't always worked, it hasn't always even been followed... but it is the system we have and the system that we benignly lead.
Younghusband
May 18, 2005
6:23 am
bq. Few ordinary Americans would knowingly support the remilitarization of international affairs and the launch of a second Cold War merely to preserve America's position as the sole military superpower on the planet, but they will never be asked the question in those terms. Instead, they will be warned of emerging "threats"Â? by people like Robert Kaplan, and told that China must be "deterred."Â? They will not be encouraged to ask: Deterred from doing what?
Younghusband
May 18, 2005
6:56 am
I agree with Barnett's idea of Core countries not warring with each other, not because they are democracies, but because of the connectedness of their economies. As "Mark noted":http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/05/time-for-kaplan-to-come-in-from-cold.html, China is all about connectivity, but as much as Barnett wants to consider China a "New Core" country, I think it still falls in the "Seam State" category, which could go either way. Thus, when they begin building weapons to protect their outwardly expanding interests (ie. subs and missile platforms), I think it is in our interest as the West to prepare for consequences that could go either way. Note that I am not saying we should directly confront them, but plan for contingencies. I personally cannot see China and the US coming to blows anytime soon (let's face it, they can't afford it), but neither is Kaplan. He sees a cat and mouse game similar to the US-Soviet posturing of the Cold War. As economically connected as China is, it still can't deal with international economic disputes the way real Core countries can, and may resort to flexing of the muscles such as mentioned in Kap's Atlantic article.
So what do we do? On the one hand, we can plan for contingencies like Kaplan describes, but at the same time we can embrace China's connectivity by helping them deal with economic disputes in regular Core fashion, as Barnett wants. In other words, *Speak Victorian, think Pagan*.
On a related note, if it is the way that Kaplan's article was presented that bothers you (ie. if this is only contingency planning, why have the Atlantic cover and not somewhere on the 4th page?) I think that may be a valid question. Mind you, the presentation of Dr. B's retort didn't impress me at all either.
Chirol
May 18, 2005
7:46 am
IJ
May 18, 2005
8:03 am
Perhaps Henry Kissinger has the answer in his book 'Diplomacy'; Curzon highlights that K argues for a flexible balance of power. But isn't this the purpose of the United Nations system, which is losing important support?
Bud Martin
May 18, 2005
11:51 am
They really don't care about Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia, Siberia, or the Pacific isles"¦ That's just to keep our eyes off their big prize, the moon. They're planning to build the first permanently manned moon base in the next twenty years. Then all they have to do is delcare it Chinese property by imminent domain. They plan to drill into it like moles and create huge underground structures and arm the moon with giant laser devices that will dominate Earth... its easier than throwing rocks using mass drivers ("The Moon is a harsh Mistress" by Robert Heinlein). Sounds like Sci-Fi, but according to the Air Force that is the most likely scenario. I don't which one is scarier, nuclear limited war over taiwan or Chinese food on the moon.
mark safranski
May 18, 2005
1:29 pm
I think Younghusband and Saru have covered a lot important aspects of China as it is rather than as " China the Enemy" of Kaplan's assumptions. Perhaps, if Kaplan is looking for an advanced state that consistently attempts to thwart American interests, we should discuss containing France.
In general, I find it dubious that China's government will be in twenty-five years what it is today. The enormous, pent-up, demand for services by the mass of peasantry is going to force Beijing toward internal development and ever greater levels of systemic accountability - if they wish to continue developing their market economy in urban areas. Even Curzon must agree as he referred to these Chinese as " future voters" rather than say, robotic slaves of some new Evil Empire.
Secondly, in terms of preparedness in case a nasty, neo-fascistic, Party-PLA faction were to seize power, it is kind of important to note that the United States is at least somewhat well-armed with a defense budget approaching 500 billion dollars annually.
While China's defense budget is many times larger than they officially admit, their military capabilities and budgetary resources are not in the same league by a long shot. So much so, that the PLA appears to be trying to find anything but a " head to head" strategy to confront the U.S. - that kind of arms race is simply too expensive for China. Similarly, China's leadership has eschewed a Soviet style nuclear arms build-up as pointless in terms of achieving China's strategic objectives.
China presents a set of strategic challenges to the United States but also some opportunities. It has been American policy since at least *The McKinley Administration* - that's right, McKinley, go read the " Open Door Note" - to " re-connect China to the rest of the world. Kaplan would have us turn away from that now at the cusp of success because he misses the intellectual security of the Cold War paradigm.
Saru
May 18, 2005
2:01 pm
However, if you read my post carefully you will see that I did not try to establish anything. I merely indicated the indisputable fact that the United States has not wiped China out. Nor did I conclude anything, most certainly not that the United States has a greater desire for peace. (Indeed, reading some of the comments on CA suggests otherwise.) Rather, I was asking for Curzon to elaborate on his original post.
Younghusband - I think you are right in thinking that China could go either way, and I do not object to planning accordingly. If Barnet's model holds true, the I suppose the key question is whether or not China will play by the rules.
Chirol - Excellent point there. I could not agree more.
Eddie - You may very well be correct that China would invade another country for its resources. But should it do so in the interest of joining the developed world, the effort would be pointless because I should hope that the developed world would never stand for such behavior. I think it is impossible to deny that a large source of China's strength has been economic growth that would not be possible without some form of interaction with the rest of the world, and that includes the United States in a major way. If the leadership of China (whatever leadership that may be) decides that risking the loss of this type of connectivity is worth gaining access to petrol, natural gas, or some other natural resource, then again, you may be correct and the world may have to face a territorially expantionist China. But, should they play by the same rules as the rest of the developed world, and obtain their resources via markets, is the opposite not equally plausible?
IJ
May 18, 2005
2:38 pm
According to the 'World Energy Outlook': "The transport sector will account for 54% of global primary oil consumption in 2030 compared to 47% now and 33% in 1971. Transport will absorb two-thirds of the increase in total oil use. Even with new fuels, transport is still expected to use 95% oil products. . . The scope for increase in China's fleet of cars is huge: there are only 10 cars for every thousand Chinese compared with 770 in North America and 500 in Europe."
And then there's food: "Oil based agriculture is primarily responsible for the world's population exploding from 1 billion at the middle of the 19th century to 6.3 billion at the turn of the 21st."
"Link":http://www.countercurrents.org/po-church0700405.htm
Dusty
May 18, 2005
5:21 pm
Regarding the link you provided on the reliance on oil for the food system (meaning the entire process from tilling to eating), I think that is a function of a system's evolution based on a plentful resource (oil) assisting food more plentiful. I do not think the survivibility of presently (or future) plentiful food availablility is dependent on oil and the food system will adapt to the the changing circumstances of oil availibility. But don't take that to mean I'm implying there can't or won't be problems as the system adapts.
And I am not sure that oil-based agriculture ought to be credited to such a degree for the world's population growth. I think, rather, advances in medicine, surging also in the mid-1800's, had a greater impact, and, later, advances in the field of, what, botony(?), which with intense research into hybridization to allowed for both more bountiful harvests and longer storage and less waste from handling during transport. (The taste of tomatoes suck now, though.)
Alfred Russel Wallace
May 18, 2005
6:01 pm
Dusty
May 18, 2005
6:03 pm
Second, I probably shouldn't have included the reference to "lebenraum" because it does not connote the thought I intended convey and I am not sure that the issues inherent in the concept of lebenraum exist much at all any more. The world is much more flexible in the movement of peoples for a true lebenraum to be an issue. What might cause a war is something of the same kind but of a different species -- movement of a people to an extent that subsequent recollectivization becomes an issue.
Tensions large and small exhibit this tendency now within the context of the American southwest, and the latent attitude recent reminesced about by Putin regarding the Baltics. With the Chinese it is there as well but, I think it has a different quality to it, one of "you may not think you are Chinese but we think you are, so you must become part of China. This blends to an extent with Nationalism, but in an extraordinary way.
I haven't seen this considered in the scheme of things and I wonder if it ought to be, say, with regard to N. Korea. I quit counting the number of times, in casual conversations not necessarily with respect to geopolitical considerations, that I have heard Chinese say the Koreans are really Chinese. It doesn't fit in totally with the the current subject of the competition for influence and a possible cold war, but I do think it can be a factor.
IJ
May 18, 2005
6:58 pm
This is surely the time for an effective refereeing system - isn't the General Council of the United Nations due to consider reform in a few months time?
Gabriel Mihalache
May 18, 2005
8:27 pm
Gabriel Mihalache
May 18, 2005
8:29 pm
J. Kende
May 18, 2005
8:37 pm
Do I think it is likely that China will take such drastic measures? No. Am I willing to trust our confidence in China's better nature to be enough to prevent terrible outcomes? Absolutely not.
Si vis pacem, indeed. We must approach China and the rest of the world with Locke in one hand and Hobbes in the other. We must engage and prepare as if we had learned the lessons of centuries and finally understood that life questions do not always have one simple answer. Let us proceed on both lines, and choose to create the outcome we desire.
We are yet in the global lead, well ahead of China and any other rivals. Our weaknesses are obvious to us, but often we forget that those who would overtake us have many exploitable weaknesses as well. The only reason I see to fear China or anyone else catching us is our current obsession with our own self-rejection. Our populace is not dedicated much today to it's own vigorous growth. The education of our young, of which I am one, is a miserable failure. We look at and wonder about the young Chinese so full of anger and looking for a fight, but what of our own young and future leaders so ready to blame ourselves for everything wrong in the world? The battle as usual is everywhere. Military, economic, diplomatic... but who will carry it forward in the years to come? If you want to see the best of outcomes, provoke our own young minds to see more of the world and become stronger, because that is our fatal weak link right now.
NYkrinDC
May 18, 2005
9:11 pm
While there are many reasons why we would end up in war with China, there are also many others that would hedge against it. Yes, China is a rising power and true they are building up their military. However, this buildup will take at least a decade to even come close to matching U.S. military prowess.
Barnett is not arguing that we should just assume that China will not attack us, or that if they do we should be confident that we can handle them. What he is saying is, that we should engage them now that we are in a position of strength, to smooth our or resolve outstanding issues and differences while at the same time working on common problems to engender a measure of trust and respect between the two sides.
If' you've read PNM or Barnett's blog, you would have noticed that Barnett doesn't argue that we should give up our overwhelming military superiority, rather he argues for repositioning our forces to address current and future threats. One of his answers is to create two forces within our military. The first would be a Leviathan force, composed mainly of the Air Force and the Navy, to take on any and all adversaries with overwhelming power and precision. That is using our air and naval superiority to pulverize the enemy's forces and will to fight. This doesn't mean ceasing to invest in our superior military power, but doing it more efficiently on the type of military we will need to confront threats and not the one we would like to have to fight future dreamt up scenarios. If you also notice, he used the term Leviathan to denote that we should maintain this superiority.
The second type of force Barnett calls for is the System Administrator which would be composed of the Army and Marines. This second force would be capable of winning military engagements, and have the necessary skills to stabilize a place after conquering it to begin reconstruction (something we so clearly lacked in Iraq). With these two forces and the cooperation of our allies, in either or both functions, we would be able to engage threats as they emerged and deal with them more effectively. The System Administrator Force would be geared more to a clean up force to repair everything we have broken. For a better explanation of this read Barnett's book or read through the archive of his blogs.
Now moving on to your personal experience with some Chinese Nationals, I must just say, that I've experienced that those same encounters with some Americans, who can't but wait till we get it on with China, a la Kaplan's Cold War II. The reason behind this is that many need an easily identifiable and defined enemy (i.e. the Soviet Union), this was the case in our military, expecting a rising China or a resurgent Russia, only to have 3000 civilians killed on September 11, 2001 by 19 guys using commercial airplanes as guided missiles. The reason the Pentagon, got caught with its pants down was because it wanted an easily identifiable enemy like those in the past, and as such ignored the reality of the larger world. Additionally, as my experience and that of others can show, one cannot gage the sentiments of a whole people, or a country based on a few conversations with some friends or colleagues overseas. This is particularly true of a country as complex as China.
In your post, you do well to point to the areas in China not touched by the benefits of China's new connectivity. China's leaders have acknowledged this and have been for the past few years trying to attend to these areas and resolve longstanding tensions there. How? Well by attempting to expand their recently found connectivity to include those regions. The Chinese realize that it is much easier to grow and prosper using the benefits of globalizations that have made China so rich in recent decades. They also now that socialism doesn't work, and pragmatically abandoned it as their governing principle. They also realize that they can only expand their prosperity by attracting investment from the rest of the world, particularly the U.S., and know they can only do that if their region is stable. As history has shown, investment doesn't flow during war, and the Chinese know they have much more to loose than we do, if it came to that.
China's expanding influence abroad and your question on what Barnett would say regarding China's expanding influence, Barnett would say that it is not a danger, but rather the expression the same root problem affecting U.S. foreign policy, mainly its need for energy resources. He has argued in his blog that people easily identify energy as the root of U.S. Foreign Policy decisions but fail to note that the same holds true for China. He argues that the problem lies in the fact that military planners, on both sides, ignore this reality, and instead spend their time planning spending wars a la Cold War II. That is we can't be fearful of China seeking energy resources throughout the globe but rather recognize that there are rational reasons behind their actions, driven by many of the things that drive us to the Middle East and yes, Latin America. Once we recognize this, we can better go about working together to resolve these problems, by having Chinese, Indian, American and other companies investing in energy resources, both petrol and alternative, to ensure that we can all have the resources we need to continue to feed our respective economic growth.
If you read PNM, Barnett cautions against this same thing as well. He sees the world as being in a similar situation as Europe encountered at the turn of the last century. The Globalization at the time was based on empires and at the turn of the centuries, there were rising powers that could not expand because of that system, as the rest of the world was already colonized by the existing powers. What happened, these players began to raise tariffs to protect internal economies, close their areas of influence to others to ensure that they could not be taken away, and built up their militaries to win the coming war. Eventually, each power followed suit, engaging in spiraling arm's races that lead to a war none wanted, nor could decisively win. This destroyed that globalization (WWI and WWII (a byproduct of the unresolved issues of WWI)).
Barnett argues that China is similarly situated to the US at the turn of the century. The Brits saw the U.S. as a rising power that could equal if not surpass their strength, rather than confront us, the Brits chose to engage the U.S. and work together on common problems to both. After the old globalization system collapsed (colonialism) the U.S. rose to power, and placed through Bretton Woods and other agreements the edifice upon which globalization would be rebuilt. Barnett argues that we must do the same with the Chinese; we need to recognize the challenges they face and engage them to resolve them. We also need to connect them to this for of globalization so that they benefit as much as we and the rest of the West do.
As for the part of the argument relating to Latin America, specifically, it is only natural that the states in the region begin to look to the outside as only then can their economies grow independent of the U.S. Most economists and development specialists have argued for years that this needed to be done. I call it horizontal integration to the world. It is another aspect of globalization. The first, vertical integration related to how the developing world connected to the developed economies of the west, now however, these states are connecting to each other and rising Core countries, fueling each others development in turn. Where Chavez is concerned, he is a problem we will have to deal with eventually, but of a different sort than China or the rest of Latin America.
Finally, as a last point on Barnett's strategy I would just add that his strategy is not about overconfidence in China's desire for peace. Rather, his strategy is based on the premise that by engaging this rising power and having it benefit from the current world system and globalization it is less likely to want to tear the system down as Japan, Germany and Italy tried to do at the beginning of the last century. His theory is that if you make the system indispensable for the Chinese to prosper, then the Chinese will have no reason to change it. In short, it is about managing threats and turning potential enemies into partners and assets in the system. It is a strategy based on preparation, not fearmongering.
Younghusband
May 18, 2005
11:35 pm
Curzon
May 18, 2005
11:44 pm
My one specific response is to "the Glittering Eye's post":http://www.TheGlitteringEye.com/cgi-bin/mt-tb.cgi/777 on the subject arguing for us to lean back and do nothing.
No -- do both! Regardless of China's own internal problems that, our encouragement aside, they will try and solve, those who would not prepare for an invasion of Taiwan or some other challenge to US presence in influence in the west Pacific are being dangerously optimistic.
And I'm glad to say again that our discussion here is purely academic. No one here mentioned what I argued was the unfolding reality: a shifting balance of power unfolding before our eyes.
Jason
May 19, 2005
4:46 am
Keep up the good work all. I may just become a regular reader.
Sam
May 19, 2005
12:27 pm
I'm another newbie, a young one (17), and I also would like to thank you all for engaging in this intelligent, civilized, and productive debate. Having lived in China for a little while now (I'm of the English teacher variety. I teach about 800 students), I've studied this issue very intently, and am trying hard to figure out what's going to happen next.
Most of what I was going to say has already been covered, but I do have a few short (methinks) comments.
Curzon--"College students spray bile about Japan in an inarticulable rage. Civil engineers tell me over beers how they long for a chance to kick the US's fanny."
Japan is a whole nother issue, so let's talk about the latter comment.
While traveling via hard seat on Chinese trains, and while dwelling in dirt-floor hotel rooms, and while meeting with various students (middle school, high school, college, and postgrad students) outside class, I've asked the same question about the USA many times. And the most popular response by far has been that the USA is a "very, very good country."
Despite recent attempts by the government to curb their enthusiasm, the best Chinese students still want desperately to study in the USA, the land of opportunity. Despite differing positions on various issues such as Japan, Taiwan, North Korea, Burma, etc. Chinese people still view the USA as a very good place, and try hard to establish connections with Americans (my email inbox is flooded with emails from Chinese people whom I hardly know). Despite their uncommonly (sometimes uncomfortably) strong nationalism/patriotism, most Chinese with whom I've conversed wish--paradoxically, in a sense--that they could go to the USA.
It's no secret that foreign investment is fueling the extremely speedy economic development of China. We know this, they know this--it doesn't go unappreciated. The most common view of Americans isn't, "I want to kick their country's fanny," it's more like, "man, they probably have a lot of money. I hope I can get rich too! (maybe I'll rip them off a few hundred kuai)"
The fact that most Chinese don't actually hate Americans having been established, I have two more questions.
1. "Globalization, integration, elected governments, liberal democracy, integration and technology have not eliminated the desire in humanity to get hot-blooded and kill each other."
Do you have any reason for believing this? Any recent examples? I recognize that this is your side's "assumption," but I'd still like to know why you think so, because I don't.
2. Can you name any examples of countries that underwent gigantic popular economic development ("popular" meaning the money mostly goes to actual citizens, not a wealthy few) and DIDN'T also develop more moderate governments? Especially with our current level of economic and political interdependence, do you really think it's even possible?
(Personally, I doubt the motivation for a war is/will be there, and even if the government wants to go for it, I doubt there's a will among the people anyway, and by now they can't be brainwashed into it)
Chirol
May 19, 2005
1:32 pm
Curzon
May 19, 2005
2:59 pm
Wonderful -- my only concern is your survey sample. Are you communicating in English? How many in China speak English? What of the 750 million peasants, how do they feel? Do you think their outlook is influenced by who they are talking to? And what do these people think about Taiwan? Or Japan?
I am a student of history -- Kissinger's Diplomacy, the Muqadimmah, the Cartoon History of the Universe Volume III, Gibbon's Rise and Fall, Kaplan's Surrender or Starve, Pinker's The Blank Slate, Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel...
Yes. I recommend Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy!
GABRIEL: Yes, Barnett floored me at first. My problems? I am turned off by the rude denouncement of his critics, and his evisceration of any opinion other than his own (he should take a page from Kaplan's book), and his blog tends to be too much about his personal life.
Jing
May 19, 2005
7:44 pm
Anyways, I'd just like to conclude on the note that while Barnett's rebuttal was indeed rude, yours is somewhat misguided and borderline childish?
"Whadaya say Dr. Barnett? Care to engage those points based on a rational argument sans mention of my intelligence and illicit drugs? GO ON, I DARE YOU!"
What are we? 6 year olds on a playground?
RichL
May 20, 2005
2:49 am
There is an excess of capital relative to natural resources in the world economy now. This capital is being utilized productively to reduce the use of energy,eg. the use of winglets on commercial airplanes that reduce the use of kerojet fuel by 9-14%. This is going on in all sectors of the economy. In China, which is far less energy efficient, these investments have a far faster payback.
In other words, regarding resources - DON'T PANIC.
The troubling aspect of China's relations with Japan, at least to me, is that it seems to be a mechanism to focus dissent on the distant neighbor. While that beats dissent vs. the government (from the government's point of view), it also points to the prospect that when economic times get tough it wouldn't be too far from the current playbook to start a war with someone to focus the people on something other than their own problems.
With respect to US relations with the PRC, it should be kept in mind that economic growth, and the clear sense that the Chinese people have a future to build, is incompatible with a wartime mentality. Taking the temperature of the relationship when times are more difficult should be the test. Hopefully this will be a long way off, but... in the meantime, don't beat all of your swords into plowshares.
Sam
May 20, 2005
6:27 am
Curzon--I communicated with them in Chinese.
NYKrinDC
May 26, 2005
2:04 pm
I think you misread Barnett and misunderstand his argument. Most assessments on China I've read, be they in Foreign Policy journals or even NPR and other such venues, have put the figure anywhere from 10-50 yrs. I am simply taking those assessments and using the one closer to your point of view. Regardless of how long, the fact is that right now we are stronger than China and hence should use that leverage to bring China into the system. Tie it to the system and it becomes less likely to want to change it. Why? China will benefit too much from that system to want to take it down. That is one of the basic premises of Barnett's argument. Barnett doesn't argue that China is not a rising power, he acknowledges that it is. He doesn't argue that we should just sit idly by while it rises, but rather that we manage the threat. What this means is using our power and leverage to tie it to the system, to recognize that China and we share similar problems (i.e. scarce energy resources, terrorism) that we can address together now before they become crises.
You think confronting China right now and going to war is going to achieve any of that? No, all it is likely to do is tear down a system from which we both benefit and allowing another power to take our place, in a similar manner in which WWI and WWII allowed the US to rise in the vacuum left by the European powers that were destroyed by both wars. In fact, this is a driving force in Barnett's thinking, rather than allow passions and "human nature"Â? if you will to drive us over the precipice why not recognize the challenges ahead of us now so that we can develop the strategies to manage them now and in the future and hence prevent a similar outcome. As Barnett is fond of saying, history repeats itself, just not in the same manner.
On another note, you are correct to say that their strength relative to their neighbors is extremely relevant; however even then we are still more than a match for the Chinese navy. Additionally we have enough allies in the region to offset that threat in the time being. The challenge now is getting the Chinese to recognize that an arms race or conflict are self-defeating and hence to be avoided. Again, a call to manage the threat, without engaging in self-defeating strategies or self-fulfilling prophecies like the one you are advocating. I mean, how much of a strategy is it to build up our forces and threaten the Chinese, to have them react to our actions in an equal manner, just so that we can react to their reaction to our original action, and so on and so forth until we reach a point were the only answer is war even if neither of us intended to get there in the first place. I'd choose to manage the threat, than what you are proposing.
That said I think there are valid arguments against Barnett's thesis, it's just that yours isn't one of them. First it isn't well formulated and relies far too much on "human nature"Â? something I consider a red herring unless backed up by real analysis and data to support that analysis.
As for my statement regarding your reading of Barnett's blog and PNM, you obviously did not pay attention to that either, because I did not only say that you had not read his book or blog (too limiting), rather I said that even if you had, you failed to understand it fully.
My original quote "Reading your post, I don't think you have read Barnett's blog on a regular basis, and if you have, you've missed a few things."Â?
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