Recently, Saru and I have been bandying back and forth ideas through the email about what to do with Iran. It all started when he sent me this article by Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh. We wrote over 4000 words to each other, and will probably write more, but I will try to bring some of the more salient points in the open for others to offer their thoughts on. This is a little long, and I recommend you read the article, but enjoy!
Starting with my reply:
Yes I read it all. I think it was correct in its diagnosis, but thought the proposed implementation for a cure is wrong. …
Personally I don’t think that the US should engage Iran directly, at least not at first. Primarily there is the problem of dealing with the regime. The Iranian bureaucracy is the proverbial tail wagging the dog of the Iranian people. A small minority controlling everything, that is completely different from the people. The people like the US and want better “connectivity” with the world, but the regime does not. Also, the Iranian people are very nationalistic, and stubborn as all hell. So whatever the US does in Iran will get twisted. Sanctions will harden the people’s hearts against the US. I truly think the regime’s days are numbered, and the last thing we want is the poeple hating the US after the regime is gone (think Mosadeq). If the US gives the gov economic benefits the propaganda machine will revere it as a victory over the Great Satan. Either way the US loses.
You see, there is a lot of face on both sides that needs to be saved. Iranians have their pride, and so does the US. Also I don’t think each side truly understands what the others needs are. For example, most Iranian people couldn’t give a flying shit about Palestine. That was Khomeini’s baby, and is widely considered an Arab problem. Thus Iran has extremely scaled back its official support of Hizb’allah. I think the only reason they still hold annual demonstrations (Qods) is due to tradition, and as a propaganda tool for the gov to stir up nationalism.
Secondly, you have to remember that Iranians are not Arabs. In fact, they hate Arabs, and Arabs aren’t too friendly towards Persians either. Unfortunately, they are surrounded by Arabs, and also have nuclear Pakistan on their border. Nukes are not just meant as a defense against the US (although that is a nice side-effect), the Iranians see it as a hedge against its surrounding countries.
Iran has massive “poor me” syndrome. This victimization complex is plain to see in everyday life and is due to state controls on media. One day last November I saw the Iranian government back down to European negotiations on the BBC website, only to look up and see on state TV an official saying that Iran would never give up its rights and bend to the will of the Europeans. Iranian people have little idea what goes on outside their borders, and are suspicious of outside information outlets. So while their gov goes around acting belligerent and Iran gets some economic blowback, they never explain to the people what is happening, so the public, not understanding the situation, can only ask “Why do they hate us?”
I don’t think the US Admin really understands this situation. What should be done?
What I think is needed is a third party to act as a go-between so as to make any promises made look like they were done on even ground. Iran does not trust the US or Britian, and the US does not trust France or Germany, so I think the go-between should be Japan, with Europe playing second. The Iranians really respect the Japanese, and the Japanese have huge investments in Iran.
So the CIA should get on the horn to Tokyo who should approach Tehran to say that it is a concerned investor looking to strengthen Iran which will strengthen its investments. Japan can then relay needs not demands back and forth, and starting small I think the US and Iran can work together. For example, the US can tell Iran that it will keep Pakistan on a tight leash, and protect Iran’s west side from Arab and Israeli intrusion. Iran can ask for economic benefits, relieving of sanctions, etc and offer help in Afghanistan and Southern Iraq.
But the key is doing it through a third party that both the US and Iran trust, then everyone looks like equals and it gives Iran’s propaganda machine no excuse to rail against the US. The US cannot seem like they are supporting the regime (like in Uz), but must build a relationship that allows them access to the people. Once more FDI floods into the country, and a stronger middle-class is formed then I think we could see a rebellion from within. Turkish Telecom is building all the new telecom networks for Iran, connecting everyone to broadband. This will help in people getting a better look at the world, even though their connection will be somewhat controlled. I think the US should be doing whatever it can to increase this kind of connectivity to the outside world.
Iran is also getting closer to China. Maybe a way to make a trilateral trading partnership between the three could work… (cars, oil, who knows?) But there has to be a way to calm the administration down while still getting exposure to the public. Maybe it won’t cause a massive rise up, but when the current regime fails, and it will someday, the US will have a ready made partner in the region for the future.
One more reason why I think Japan should be “The One” (as opposed to say, Turkey) is that they are not “People of the Book”, who have a completely different status in the eyes of the Iranians. Consider the religious element removed.
Well, that is some of my random thoughts on the situation. This is unedited and kinda all over the place but I hope you understand what I mean. I am willing to answer any other questions you have.
Best as always,
YH
Saru says:
Much thanks for your thoughtful comments on the article. Last week we
organized a brown bag lunch for [our] junior staff and had Ray Takeyh
and his RA (who is also Iranian and just about to finish her PhD at
SAIS) talk to us and answer questions about the situation in Iran. In
addition to being fascinated by wha… I wish
you could have been there to sit in on it because I think you would
have gotten much more out of it than I did.
I think I can see your point about it being difficult for the US to
directly engage Tehran because of the inevitable spin it will receive.
Is the government’s control over information so tight that people
would not begin to suspect that they were being lied to eventually?
From what I read of your Iran diary, I got the impression that at
least some of the younger generation seemed somewhat computer literate
(or at least possess a desire to become so.) However much distrust of
outside information there is, isn’t there also a degree of distrust of
officially sanctioned information as well? Perhaps this is irrelevant
though because I would guess that any connectivity to the outside
world is going to be limited to large cities, and even then to the
youth of large cities. I gathered from what Sanam said last week that
most of the youth aren’t willing to spill blood over a political cause
when there are much less painful and less obvious ways to act
subversively.
I thought one of the problems with the solution Pollack and Takeyh
proposed in the article was the difficulty of bringing together U.S.
“allies” and agreeing upon a consensus policy. I read in the news
today that the Russians are going ahead with their deal to provide
uranium as long as the Iranians return the spent fuel afterwards.
Between the US, the EU, and Russia, everyone is looking out for their
own interest, and it’s difficult to get everyone to see eye to eye
(similar problem in Iraq). That’s not including when the Japanese and
Chinese are sitting at the table. Bring them into the picture and the
bargaining gets even more complicated.
For example, we were fine to look the other direction when the
Japanese signed oil deals with Iran because we needed and wanted to
appear grateful for their assistance in Iraq. But if a unified front
is to be created, that kind of thing is going to have to stop. That
means providing incentives not just for the Iranians, but also for the
Japanese, the Europeans, and anyone else we need to go along with us.
Even small countries like Ukraine would have to be brought inline and
not be allowed to transfer weapons to Iran. Maybe it will eventually
get to the point where the others will come around and see that a
nuclear Iran might not be the most desirable outcome for ROW, but
maybe that time will arrive too late.
As for using the Japanese as a go between, it looks great, but my
question is are the Japanese capable of (or willing to) pulling this
off?
…
This is pretty discursive and written without a great deal of thought
as well. Still, any further thoughts on this or whatever else are
welcome. As you can see by the incoherence of this mail, I’m starving
for good discourse that will force me to think.
Best,
Saru
YH replies:
About the media: Iran is like every other despotic ME country, it is a huge rumor mill. Nobody trusts the media. They have a wide variety of alternative media (BBC Persian service, lots of Persian radio/tv broadcast via satellite out of L.A. aka “Tehrangeles” etc) but don’t trust any of it. One guy told me the BBC was out to “get” Iran! I asked him why, and if he had proof, and he said, “Uh… because they are!” So the rumor mill runs on overload, and people will discount the BBC for what some bum on the street-corner says. It is insane, but I don’t blame them. And since rumors tend to be very personal, about “somebody I know” the Iranians get very protective about one another. Combine this with the strange vacuum of identity (Iran has 2 histories/legacies, pre-Muslim Persian times, and Muslim times, which are emphasized or de-emphasized depending on who’s in power) and you get strong nationalism. They may not rise up in the streets to revolt, but if America attacks you can guarantee it will be like 1930’s Japan and you’ll have women in the streets practicing with naginata waiting for US GI’s.
About the go-between: I think you make an excellent point about incentives for everyone involved. More reason to keep the go-between as small as possible. I think Japan has enough of a stake in Iran (80% of their oil, stuff like this) that they would see partnering the US with Iran would be a smart play. I definitely think they could be convinced. Whether they are up to the task… well, they haven’t done this before. But they have a good reputation in the region, and have experience negotiating aid-like deals in a whole slew of SE Asian countries… you never know unless you try.
Saru again: About Bushehr
What I meant to say in the previous mail was that it seems like this
would have been the perfect kind of incentive to use jointly to get
Iran to cooperate. Instead, the Russians go ahead with the project
alone, with the US of course complaining all the way. (I don’t know
details, so maybe I’m missing something important here?)
Younghusband replies:
This is kinda touchy since it was the “first” incident of this kind. Iran is completely wrong on this issue. They are signees to the NPT and can get help on light water reactors if they ask for it. The fuel can be shipped in from other countries (like Russia), that is what every other country does. But no, they decide that they want to make their own fuel (remember how protectionist they are? Plus, they can sell that fuel to bolster their tepid economy).
I think they had to be given the hard line to show that they are not above the law, too bad Russia undermined the NPT by helping the Iranians build Bushehr. I think some sort of compromise would have been regarded as appeasement and a “victory” over the Great Satan. In fact, it is even considered to be that now.
It would be a lose-lose situation, and anyways it is over now. Key point is the US has to get in there before they make a nuke for “protection,” so they can steer the outcome and have the pieces aligned for the future.
Saru:
… The problem is convincing the Japanese to step up to the plate
and actually do something helpful, as opposed to sending a bunch of
worthless SDF to Iraq where we have to beg the Dutch, the Aussies and
the Brits to come in and protect them (I love the irony of the
Self-Defense Forcese requiring protection from outside forces). I
plan on bringing this up with some of the Asia senior fellows at work
tomorrow and hearing them out on it. I can’t offer any hard evidence
at the moment that would shore up my feeling that the Japanese would
never go for such an active diplomatic role, but my gut really tells
me it would never happen.
Younghusband:
Evidence… yeah… Like I said they have never really done anything like this before (at least to my knowledge), so some sweet-talking will have to be done. But they sure do love the peace-maker role, even if they do take the background. Take the LTTE for example. Norway was the central player in that affair, but everybody on the ground knew that J-money and diplomacy was all over the place, balancing the one-sided Norwegians. Why do you think Wickramasinghe came to Japan first right after the ceasefire in 2003? To confer with Akashi!
If you outline to the Japanese about security of their investment, and tell them that “we can’t do it without you” you may be able to pull it off. But I entirely understand your gut about Japan and “active” roles. Maybe tell them that if they want to be part of the SecCouncil they are gonna have to take a more active role.
END FOR NOW
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Comments to this entry
Curzon
March 2, 2005
3:00 pm
Peter
March 2, 2005
5:33 pm
Very interesting thoughts, guys. I think you're on the right track, YH, when you say "Personally I don't think that the US should engage Iran directly, at least not at first." Rash actions - whether militaristic or diplomatic - aren't usually the best course. Although I'm intrigued about the idea that more economic "carrots" (and therefore more prosperity for the Iranian people) would _help_ any dissention or civil unrest (against the regime) rather than hurt it. History shows *most* of the time that unrest is inversely proportional to economic prosperity. That is to say, people are generally happier when they have more money.
I see your point, however, that the sort of economic rewards you propose are essential in growing the middle class. This in turn, is more or less essential to a revolution - a la the bourgeoisie during the _ahem_ "regime change in France":http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_revolution#Causes, circa 1789.